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I. 
RESPONSE TO THE SEPARATIONISTS' 
STATEMENT REGARDING ISSUES IN THIS CASE 
The Separationists "' statemei it capti • oi ied "Nc z I Issues on 
Appeal"" won id nave this Court believe zha\ .,*.- ^ . c^rnc <* ^ a < ^ 
i -• -*r .-,a*-i^ r -r ^  - >~ vs' d I " ear 'oris::* t.. ~? .-. 
pr* v ^ s * ^ - -
As amp:y ' iem^i.strat-ec . ' iv- , , I . I A , . -termerr ; . :^qiridj . n i . e : r . 
1 - tit; au _L«dou O X A CliwICa* ISSUeS 
involved here, 
While the Separationists may wish to keep the issue overly 
narrowed, they have brought upon themselves the necessity for 
considering the other issues by virtue of their tactics and 
pleadings below. It would be most unfortunate for this Court to 
leave local government and local government counsel without this 
Court's guidance on all the important matters presented here. 
II. 
RESPONSE TO THE SEPARATIONISTS' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
governed the proceedings below, the Council Members submitted to 
the lower court in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment 
27 numbered paragraphs of Undisputed Facts. All were thoroughly 
documented with admissible evidence. (R. 192-203 and 233-487.) 
The Separationists, in their Memorandum in Support of their 
Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted absolutely no facts. (See 
Separationists' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, R. 
501-522.) 
Early on in the litigation below, considerably before either 
party had filed any motions for summary judgment, the 
Separationists submitted a free-standing "Statement of Undisputed 
Facts". (R. 61-7.) The "Statement" is almost a paragraph-by-
paragraph recitation of the plaintiffs' Complaint including such 
supposed "facts" as the unsubstantiated "fact" that the 
"[Separationists] are entitled to a permanent injunction . . . ." 
Later, contemporaneously with their Memorandum in Support of 
2 
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"Supr emer* - - ^ t o m e r * ' . d i s p u t e d / a c •- t . . ^ ,e 
"Supf- -e -1* -' <• * • ir - ' ^ Vu 1 ^ ., _ 
L . J . ^ ..'. - - ,-_ U-r:'. iV^mbf- i w.- ^ i _ > '^ - . > / 
t<: - ' TI i r + - S t a t;eri^inf n^ri -'ur^c Lemer * .-: ^tatemerr i : moved **' 
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Final:; .- Couno,; v^ r,r>. .. . iic^ va:-- ,: any prov: « -1 
.^ :-\ ^  ^  _ ___ . _- Procedure which v^ul^ elevate the 
p n i i o s c p r r . o a <t s p a t e ^xjarai 
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u. ' " ' ^J ••' ' IIL Liiwj-i JubmiLtec , 'i> 'jun-i: Member 
orig m a 1. Brief , 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE ACLU-.. -. - -.-. u£Go.n;;Vi 
ACTIONS CF TH/ ,,i_:L ARE NOT ACCORCED 
ANY JUDICIAL PRESUMPTION OF "A IDITY OF 
DEFERENCE IS WRONG AND IT MANIFESTS A BA^.^ 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF A MUNICIPAL COUNCIL'S 
In violation of Rule 24;*-: , Utdi, R * Apt-. „; 
Separationists railed to provide this Court. *vith the record 
citations for the City's objection to thi~ attempt to improperly 
introduce non-evidence into the record. -R. 4?6-7, 5 34-5, 5 37-9 
and 747-9.- The Separationists make trie same error In failing to 
creseiv the Court with the record citations to the CouncL 
^bject.ions tc the Wisn»~ expert philosooher affidavit. 
t;re Councii Memcei^ «.i . + -^•„^ J._,„ _,, j beparat^cnist^ 
i. unsel's continuing efforts to obscure the import a: * 
u rstitutional Issues involved here bv i^ r-rop^ r .nnuenac -.'4a.: 
tne Council. 
3 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE COURTS. 
The ACLU states that it is "patently absurd" to grant any 
judicial deference or extend the presumption of constitutionality 
of the legislative acts of the elected legislators of Salt Lake 
City. (ACLU Brief, p. 4.) This trivialization of the important 
role of local government in the State is a manifestation of the 
Separationists', the ACLU's and the lower court's 
misunderstanding of the legitimate function of local 
government.3 Further, this abrasive, but candid statement by 
the ACLU is near the heart of the lower court's errors and is, 
therefore, in need of this response. 
First, contrary to the assertion by the ACLU, the Council 
Members have never claimed that they are not "accountable to this 
Court". (ACLU, p. 4.) The Council Members have and do here 
assert that as elected legislators of Salt Lake City, their 
legislative acts and decisions are presumptively constitutional 
and the Separationists have the burden of proving any claimed 
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Council 
Members' original Brief, Point III, p. 40.) Case law 
demonstrates that it is a universally accepted rule in this 
country that municipal legislative acts, like State statutes, are 
3The lower court gave lip service to the concept of granting 
deference to the Council. (Memorandum Decision, p. 13. 
Attachment 2 to the Council Members' original Brief. R. 990.) 
However, it failed, in fact, to give such a presumption of 
validity or any deference whatsoever to the City Council's 
legislative acts. In addition, it totally ignored the individual 
Council Member's legislative immunity from personal liability, 
and their Speech and Debate Privileges. See Point II, below. 
4 
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v: :h soiPe oartici.!1ar' const-; tut i on a ] -roT"i~ "^  
Tru- ; »;rae:i :^ showing i rival i ":i I , * ; ordinance 
Salt ud,<e Ci^ 'v Savage, ^41 F 7i ;r,.:\ . ' < :ra:i :?"5 :ert 
d e n «it-; : • * 
S i m i l a r l y , P r o f e s s o r M c ^ u j . . m . .. r. .- . . - ^ p e c i e a t r e a *_o-;, 
/* *fc ; ~ - ' i i n i r ; ^ ' . ^-^ Tiar4 • r - i ^ ^ s - ;>>: s • .^  r e d : 
1
 •' ^Uui lo , -Vi.^ ^ riot Qfcjfw.die
 L -s .Lia L L 3 ^  i J . U ' I 
, ^ a upon c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds u n i e s s it: p l a i n l y 
c o n t r a v e n e s some f * '--ision if * - . r c r ^ t i t r. : :n . 
. n i c i p a l „,^ lLjLi 3::nDn£ *T *: p ':* 
.*. i.:^e. -iiiiLnasis adde :.. r o c c n o t e 
s t a t e s : • • ^ •• •..- .• 
A m U l U L . ^ c i . •-•UU.jLiiciiiv.-vJ ^^^2 - " « - - - - * - . l t : l .i.UL 1 d* / 3 P l u i 
powers is presumably constitutional ^nd bindinc 
The presumption is that the local legislative 
ouay intended not to violate the Constitution, but to 
enact a valid ordinance within the scope of its 
constitutional powers. [ 1 It has been declared that 
the presumption attaches to a municipal ordinance as 
strongly as it does to a fstate! legislative enactment. 
Not only must unconstitutional,..- ^ .••.*. .^aixy, 
it has been asserted, it must appear -ina be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. [ j If the constitutional 
questions raised are fairly decatabi^.. -he court must 
declare the ordinance con^-^;:- ^  - -. ' -~ -he court 
5 
cannot and must not substitute its judgment for that of 
the local legislative body. 
Id. at §19.06, pp. 512-513. (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.) 
Although Savage and McQuillin discuss the presumption of 
constitutionality afforded to municipal "ordinances", the 
rationale is equally applicable to municipal legislative actions 
evidenced by the adoption of a legislative "resolution". This 
observation is compelled by the fact that a "resolution" is, just 
like an "ordinance", a legislative enactment. Reynolds, Local 
Government Law, 182-183 (West Publishing Co. 1982). Similarly, 
commentators have noted that the distinction between an 
"ordinance" and a legislative action adopted by a "resolution" 
can be one of form rather than substance.4 
4Utah statutes specifically provide that "resolutions" shall 
be in the same form as "ordinances" and that votes for each shall 
be by roll call. §§10-3-506, 717 and 718, U.C.A., 1953. 
Further, even though legislative power is usually exercised by 
ordinances (especially where criminal sanctions, fines or 
forfeitures are to be employed), the law permits the legislative 
body to exercise certain administrative and legislative powers by 
adoption of a "resolution". §10-3-717, U.C.A., 1953. The 
ultimate power of any legislature, the adoption of a budget, can 
be exercised in Utah cities by either ordinance or resolution. 
§10-6-118, U.C.A., 1953. Under Salt Lake City's optional 
Council-Strong Mayor form of governance the City Council is 
limited to only performing legislative powers. Martindale v. 
Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Utah 1978). 
Also, while the final results of legislative ordinances have 
their primary effect on the public at large, the internal 
workings and procedures of the legislature act primary upon 
itself, as a separate and co-equal branch of government. This 
difference underscores this Court's duty to defer to the 
legislative body's decisions concerning its own internal 
procedures. See Mecham v. Gordon, 156 Ariz. 297, 751 P.2d 957, 
962-3 (1988); Beitelspacher v. Risch, 105 Idaho 65, 671 P.2d 1068 
(1983) . 
6 
This Court has recognized the important: role of local 
government in Utah and held that local legislative bodies are 
fully empowered to exercise their jurisdiction to solve, with 
creativity and distinction, pressi rig social problems State v. 
Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980). Salt Lake City has the 
constitutional dignity -if being designated as the State's 
capital. (Article XXII, Section Utah Constitution ) la 
addition, the Constitution grants home rule powers to cities by 
specifical 1 y 1 imitirig 11 ie powei: of t: 1 ie State 1 egislature to 
delegate "municipal functions" to others. (Article VI, Section 
28, Utah Constitution.) It also prohibits the legislature from 
granting franchise or i nterfering with cities' rights-of-way, 
(Article VII, Section 8, Utah Constitution.) 
Ir -.:.-•• "ait Lake City Council is not a rag-tag foster 
child of the State as suggested by the ACE .U. Rathe- . tr>- - - Til 
is entitled * * r>- tignity ai.d respect of a legislative body 
elected ^ • • •* • State. The failure of the lower 
court and the other parties to this litigation to accept tf lis 
fact is a mind-set that has partially led to the error below. 
The Council Members respec : . :.- . >nrt- t . soec;_f ically 
address this issue in its decision /:.*• Lty Council ^ 
legislative acts must be afforded the deference and give *. :e 
presumptions of validity to wh I ch tl ley are enti t:i•-»<- r-<i-- :ne 
separation of powers concept. 
7 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT JUDGMENT AND ORDER, DIRECTED 
AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COUNCIL MEMBERS, IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The Separationists' Brief undertakes a radical 180 degree 
change of position from that earlier taken in the lower court and 
in a motion filed with this Court in June. They now assert that 
it is their "understanding" that the lower court's Order only 
enjoins the City Council, as an institution, and does not affect 
the respondent-Council Members as individuals.5 
The Separationists' vigorously argued a contrary position 
before the lower court. For example, when the City Council 
Members answered the Separationists' interrogatories, they did so 
by majority vote and as a Council action, consistent with their 
expectation that they had been sued in a representative 
capacity.6 The Separationists objected and filed a Motion 
before the lower court to have each Council Member answer 
individually, under oath, on the premise that they had been sued 
as individuals. The lower court ruled with the Separationists 
and ordered that the Answers to Interrogatories be refiled, with 
5See Separationists' Brief, p. 7-8, footnote 3. Also, note 
the term "Council" in the Brief. See for example: 
Separationists' Brief p. 11, 13, 15. Previously, the 
Separationists referred only to the Council Members, as 
individuals. 
6In violation of Rule 4-502(3), C.J.A., the Separationists 
failed to provide the lower court with the Council Members' 
original Answers in their Motion to Compel which are, therefore, 
not in the record. See the Council Members' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Compel. R. 719-23. 
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each Council Member signing individually.7 
Following the lower court's Memorandum Decision, the 
Separationists filed a Proposed Order, The Council Members 
objected to this document, among other reasons, because it 
applied to then as Individuals and, thus, violated their 
constit ,:;LOL., ,-:r< - • se.i for the Separationists again 
insisted that the Council Members were sued as inc. . ;ud.-
required that a judgment for costs be granted against each 
Member, including Torn Uudfrey and N.irv'v' P.icn who had voted 
against the Council's opening ceremony policy. Again, the lower 
court accepted the Separationists' position and entered the 
Order, as proposed.9 
As late as June 1992, counsel for the Separationists 
asserted before uiis Court that only the individuals were being 
sued.10 In its Motion to Dismiss this appeal, tt le 
Separationists succinctly stated: 
7. Plaintiffs' [Separationists] complaint names the 
defendants individually, and seeks relief from them in 
7See Separationists' Motion to Compel, the various relevant 
memoranda, and the Court's subsequent Order; R.7 05-7, 719-2 3, 
730-3, 740 and 750-2. 
8See, Defendants' "Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Order 
Granting Summary Judgment and Motion for Clarification of 
Memorandum Decision", R. 999-1006 and annexed as Attachment 3 to 
the Council Members' original Brief. Compare the Separationists' 
response below, R. 1016-31, included as Attachment "1" to this 
Brief. 
9See "Order Granting Summary Judgment" dated April 9, 1992 
k 1055-8; Attachment "4" to the Council Members' original Brief. 
10See Separationists' "Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed with 
this Court dated June 2, 1992, OT7-13, 18-20. 
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their individual capacity only. 
8. The relief sought . • . seeks to bind only the 
individually named defendants [Council Members] . . ., 
not successor Council Members or the municipal 
corporation. 
18. The Salt Lake City Council is not a party to this 
lawsuit. 
(Empha s i s added.) 
The result was that each Council Member was compelled to 
appeal in order to avoid attachment of their personal assets to 
pay the judgment for costs.11 The Court can deduce from the 
different filing dates and the limited purpose filing of Council 
Members Pace and Godfrey that they were compelled to appeal to 
avoid paying a judgment or having their assets attached. 
The Separationists' dramatic shift of position in their 
Brief filed with this Court is, in effect, a confession of error 
below. It is an acknowledgment by the Separationists' counsel 
that the Order he prepared and had signed by the lower court, 
over the objection of the Council Members, is overbroad and 
violates the individual Council Member's free speech rights and 
their legislative immunities.12 As such, the lower court's 
Order and Judgment should be summarily reversed. 
This concession also renders the remainder of this appeal 
L1A11 Council Members, except Godfrey and Pace, filed their 
Notice of Appeal on May 1, 1992. Council Members Pace and 
Godfrey filed May 8, 1992, one day before the appeal deadline and 
only on the cost judgment rendered against them. 
I2See Council Members' original Brief, Point I and V for 
detailed discussion. 
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moot because wi thout I in* individual dPt^ ndrint-s , the 
Separa*tionists have nc other party remaining in the suit, by 
their own admission. However, this Coutt may elect to render a 
decision on the merits because tl lis is ^ matter of too great a 
public importance to not be judicially tesolved. Kennecott Corp. 
v. Salt Lake County, 7 02 P.2a 4ji (Utah 1985). 
Whichever course this Court elects, i i.
 JS important, tor 
policy reasons related to the role of municipal government in 
this Statf. ..--• • . ^  :-. : -J * . - - * * - m personal 
liability A. . r. . prevent any future . •,_ ^pg effect nn thp 
performance of legislators' functions, the decision of this Co.rt 
should specifically reverse the lower oourt Order, wh I v _J -es 
the Council Members' legislative immunities and Speech a: . Debate 
Privi l^ges, • 
POINT III. 
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION REQUIRE A MULTI-FACETED 
ANALYSIS AND NOT THE APPLICATION OF STATUTORY 
"PLAIN MEANING" STANDARD. 
AX)Lh trie bepdrdiiorii SLS -unl I be ACl.u premise much of their 
argumerit on the assertion that a statutory rule of construction, 
called the "plain meaning rule", is directly applicable tc 
constitutional interpsf?±.2t±;s:? ,v: fact, the Separar • jnzscs and 
the ACI,u even cite cases interpreting a 'statute."13 
'^'-"Uiie commentators more succinctly call this type of 
/ ^or example, see Separationists' Point 1(A) addressing 
"legislative intent", as opposed to constitutional construction 
principles. Separationists' Bri ef, pp .] 5-19; ACLU Brief, pp. 5-
i i 
constitutional interpretation: "Clause Bound Textualism."1A It 
is a minority position and a discredited method of constitutional 
analysis. It fails to receive wide acceptance on many counts, 
including the fact that standing alone (except in rare cases 
where the context shows "crystal clear" intent) words all have 
variable and uncertain meanings.15 Under this improper method 
of constitutional interpretation, the basic political philosophy 
of governance and construction of civil rights issues are decided 
only by the Court's importing whatever meaning it chooses to the 
words at issue, without reference to the historical context or 
other rationale. This methodology places the Court in a dubious 
position of autocratic authoritarianism, where things are so 
simply because a majority of a Court says they are so. It 
undercuts the credibility of the Court as a deliberative 
institution whose rulings should be based on reason and whose 
rulings are subject to the constraints of historical precedent 
and stare decisis, rather than acting as a free-standing 
constitutional convention. 
There are numerous other schools of thought concerning 
constitutional interpretation. These that range from those 
14Stewart, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation, 17 
Journal of Contemporary Law, 91 (1991). 
15The Separationists' strange ad horendum arguments 
regarding womens' suffrage and polygamy are specious. 
(Separationists, pp. 21-22.) The Constitution specifically 
prohibits polygamy and allows women to vote. If these matters 
ever came before this Court the multi-faceted analysis suggested 
here by the Council Members would result in the correct 
interpretation. 
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propounded by Ed Meese to those of Lawrence Tribe and beyonu. 
Various descriptive handles are applied to these theories, 
including: "originalism", " i nterpretational Isni" and 
"principalism", The latter of these promotes the theory that a 
constitution .should bo construed to give a clause the most-
morality or integrity, as defined by the judges ••IA. ,•, :; -
decision.16 To some degree, this methodology io philosophical 
and esoteric, .10 .... :. ;i-- o;. .: i-....- s ana other 
constitutional cases• 
Contrary to the assertion of the Separationists and the 
ACLU, the Council Members have never iss^.5 .- \o the 
"subjective" intent o: :.ho ; ramers a^ - 1o~ ne considered. Rather, 
the 'iVuinoil Members •• - r> - : 4 o-^  •. urged a. multi-faceted 
interpretive procedure, which uses as its primary touchstone the 
original "intent" and "purpose" of the constitutional provision 
at issue. These are to be ascertained i- r«mi history, foundational 
principles, stare decisis, evaluation ui federal and other State 
analogiles, balancing competing constitutional values and the 
language employed,l7 
This balanced evaluation, with its touchstone on intent and 
purpose, is a method t .hat most courts have adopted and one to 
16See R. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict, 10 (1991); 
Clor, Constitutional Interpretation and Regimen Disciplines, in 
The Constitution, The Courts and the Quest for Justice, 115 
(Goldwin and Schambra Eds. 1989); McDowell, Id. at 17; Perry, Id. 
at 70; Tribe and Dorf, On Reading the Constitution, 71 {1991); W, 
Murphy J. Fleming and W. Harris, American Constitutional 
Interpretation, 289 (The Foundation Press, 1986). 
17See Council Members' original Brief, Points T =snd II 
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which this Court has subscribed. The so-called "plain meaning" 
(Clause Bound Textualism) urged by the Separationists and ACLU 
would be a most restrictive and inappropriate standard for this 
Court to adopt, and one which these parties would inevitably seek 
to change in future disputes. At least this writer would be 
surprised and disappointed if the ACLU, in another case, would 
really urge such a restrictive position. For example, it is hard 
to believe that Utah would wish the "no" in either the First 
Amendment or Article I, Section 15 to be read with its Webster's 
Dictionary meaning and have this Court (under the "plain meaning 
rule") void all laws concerning libel and slander; State security 
secrets; child pornography; obscenity; trade secrets; and all 
reasonable time, place and manner controls regarding expressive 
activity. The writer would be even more astonished if the ACLU 
seriously urged this Court to read "speech" to be limited to the 
spoken word, to the exclusion of constitutional protection for 
other communicative actions.18' 19 
Further, notwithstanding the ACLU's and Separationists' 
protestations in the case at bar about "plain meaning", the cases 
18See text of Article I, Section 15, Constitution of Utah. 
19Many basic civil liberties are included under what have 
come to be known as "penumbral" rights. Privacy, travel and 
other such rights are premised on the argument that they can be 
inferred and read into various constitutional provisions such as 
the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments pursuant to the 
unexpressed intent and purpose of the Framers. 
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cited by them did not stand for the position .i  ^sert-.^ d.20 To the 
contrary, this Court has affirmed its view that constitutional 
interpretation i>; >\ multi-faceted analysis that seeks to 
determine the intent and purpose of the framers.21 For examp] e, • 
in addressing the importance of developing law under the Utah 
Constitutioi 1, 11 11s Coi :i i: t annt;»n.need that local counsel should give 
serious consideration to State constitutional concepts, as 
opposK : r ":>lisLic reliance on their federal counterparts. In 
doing so, this Court cited with approval !;h>: summary of the 
scholarly commentary and analytic techniques set forth by the 
Supreme Com I ot Vermont,, State v. Earl, 716 P. 2d 803 (Utah 
20See discussion of Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 
P.2d 378 (1970), and other cases cited by ACLU and Separationists 
in the Council Members' original Brief at p. 18-27. The ACLU 
continues to misstate the holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
in Re Initiative Petition No. 281, State Question No. 441 v. 
Rogers, 434 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1967). (ACLU, p. 6.) The ACLU 
implies that the Oklahoma Supreme Court gave first priority, as a 
rule of interpretation, to the "plain meaning" rule. In fact, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held clearly that "plain meaning" was 
only one way of determining constitutional intent, It was the 
discernment of constitutional intent which was the primary rule 
of constitutional Interpretation. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
held: 
The first rule for construing constitutional 
provisions, to which all other rules of construction 
are subordinate, is that the meaning, as understood by 
those who framed and adopted the Constitution, is to be 
ascertained and given effect. 
Id. at 951. (Emphasis added.) 
21Counsel for the Council Members acknowledges the 
assistance in preparing this analysis of an article to be 
published in the University of Utah Law Review approximately 
Thanksgiving by Brad C. Smith, "Be No More Children": An Analysis 
of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, 199 2 Utah 
L. Rev 
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1986) citing State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985). See also, 
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990).22 
The Supreme Court of Vermont's analysis in Jewett begins by 
recognizing the importance of not simply looking at only the 
plain words of a constitutional provision. The Vermont Court 
quotes with approval to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes writing that: 
Historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is 
a necessity. . . . 
Jewett, id. at p. 236. Justice Holmes is also quoted as follows: 
The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical 
formulas having their essence in their form; they are 
organic living institutions transplanted from English 
soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to 
be gathered not simply by taking the words and a 
dictionary, but by considering their origin and the 
line of their growth. 
Jewett, jji. at 236. (Citation omitted.) 
22The Court of Appeals cautioned in Bobo that the 
"thoughtful and probing analysis of State constitutional 
interpretation" should be begun before the trial court. (JEd. at 
1273.) The Council Members respectfully submit that they 
fulfilled this "thoughtful and probing analysis" before the trial 
court with a detailed historical and legal explanation of Article 
I, Section 4. (R. 192-203, 233-487 and 628-31.) 
The Court of Appeals sets out three independent steps. 
First, the Court of Appeals stated that "counsel should offer 
analysis of the unique context in which Utah's constitution 
developed. ..." (Jd. at 1272-3, fn. 5, citations omitted.) 
Second, "counsel should demonstrate that state appellate courts 
regularly interpret even textually similar state constitutional 
provisions in a manner different from federal interpretations of 
the United States Constitution and that it is entirely proper to 
do so in our federal system." (Id., citations omitted.) 
Finally, "citation should be made to authority from other states 
supporting the particular construction urged by counsel. . . ; 
[particular attention should be given to those states whose 
constitutions served as a model for the Utah Constitution." 
(JEd.. , citations omitted.) 
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The Vermont Supreme Court concluded it 5 d.srussion uf this 
style of constitutional interpretation as follows: 
Historical argument may also touch upon the legislative 
history of a particular provision, "or on the social 
and political setting in which it originated, or on the 
fate of the [provision] in subsequent constitutions." 
Jewett, 500 A.2d at 236, (Citation footnote omitted.) 
Jewett, after recognizing the primacy of historical 
argument, then noted that const: 1 t;ut i.oiw 1 iirgument* may also be 
made from the text: of the provision itself and by the 
construct..; . ' • 'iiar provisions by "sibling" states. 
(Id. at 237-8.) 
In point of fact, the use of historical devices and a multi-
faceted evaluation in construing UT"" Utah Constitution is not 
some newly discovered principle. It nas been the rule in Utah 
almost as lonq as Utah has been a state. For: example, in People 
ex rel. O'Meara v. City Council of Salt Lake Ci'- ' Utah 13, 64 
x. 460 (Utah 1900), this Court considered whether A statute, 
passed by tho leq is 1 attire authorizing the issuance of bonds r\< 
Salt Lake City for a water system, violated tl le de; - -.: 
provisions of Article XIV, Section 4 of the Constitution In 
construing 11 1 e Consti tu11 on to permit the City's bono issuance, 
this Court extensively considered the history of 
constitutional provision at issue in .1 ight of the constitutional 
framers' knowledge oj extstiiiq < 01 roumstanoes and their intent. 
The Court held: 
Those who framed the fundamental law, however, were 
confronted with the conditions and necessities with 
growing cities, and must be presumed to have had 
17 
knowledge of the fact, because a matter of current 
history, that some of them already had existing debts 
in amount largely in excess of the 4% limit, and yet 
had an entirely inadequate supply of water, light and 
sewer facilities. 
• * * 
In interpreting [the constitutional provision at issue] 
and ascertaining [its] meaning as used, it becomes 
important to consider, in the light of the conditions 
and growing necessities of the municipalities, the 
scope and purpose of the entire provision. 
"Constitutions are not to be interpreted alone by their 
words abstractly considered, but by their words read in 
light of the conditions and necessities in which the 
provisions originated, and in view of the purposes 
sought to be attained and secured." 
(Id. at 462, citations omitted, emphasis added.) 
Similarly, in Brummitt v. Ogden Water Works Co., 33 Utah 
285, 93 P. 828 (Utah 1908), this Court considered whether or not 
the continuance of a water contract (originally entered into 
prior to the Constitution) violated the provisions of Article XI, 
Section 6, regarding municipal water rights. In holding that the 
challenged action was constitutional, this Court explained that 
it was not legalizing an action which violated the Constitution. 
Instead, it was using the facts that were deemed relevant, which 
existed at the time the Constitution was adopted, to interpret 
the Constitution. The Court held: 
But what we mean is that, when it is clear that the 
facts complained of were not intended as an evasion or 
have in any manner violated the spirit of the 
Constitution, then the acts will be upheld, unless such 
acts are clearly prohibited by the language contained 
in the Constitution. In other words, the acts must 
fall within the spirit of the constitutional 
inhibition, and not merely within the name applied to 
them. 
18 
(Id. at p. 837, emphasis added.)23 
In sum, it is respectfully submitted that the statutory rule 
of construction known as "plain meaning", or its constitutional 
counterpart, "Clause Bound Textualism", is not the appropriate 
tool of analysis in this case. It is not and has never been the 
rule of constitutional construction in Utah, nor is it in the 
vast majority of jurisdictions. The lower court was in error 
when it adopted, at the urging of the Separationists and the 
ACLU, such a narrow and one-dimensional form of analysis. This 
Court should apply its historic multi-faceted analysis, as urged 
in Council Members' original Brief, Points I and II. 
POINT IV 
THE SCHOOL GRADUATION PRAYER AND FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE CASES CITED BY THE SEPARATIONISTS 
AND THE ACLU ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THIS COURT'S 
ANALYSIS HERE. 
The Separationists and the ACLU cite graduation school 
prayer and parochial financial assistance cases from a few other 
states to support their argument that legislative opening 
ceremonies, with an invocation, are barred under the Utah 
Constitution. In doing so, they only cite those cases holding a 
23See, also, Cooper v. Utah Light and Ry. Co., 35 Utah 570, 
102 P. 202 (1909) where this Court considered the meaning of the 
words "any" and "franchise" as they related to corporations under 
the Constitution. This Court held that, as here, the 
constitutional provision in question was not clear. Accordingly, 
this Court was under a duty to provide the provision with a 
meaning and effect. In doing so this Court specifically stated 
that it was "permitted to notice the proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention" and to interpret the words as it 
"fairly appears that the words were so used and [with] such a 
meaning [as] was intended." JW. at 208. 
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particular practice invalid and, more importantly, fail to note 
the different policy and legal issues in a legislative context, 
similar to the case at bar.24 This weakness is underscored by 
the fact that, despite a 200 year history of legislative prayer 
across the country and the many identical or more restrictive 
clauses of state constitutions,25 the ACLU and the 
Separationists have never cited any case on point striking down 
the common practice of prayer by municipal, state or county 
governments.26, 27 By way of illustration, the major cases cited 
by the Separationists and the ACLU will be discussed below. 
The California cases cited by the Separationists, Sands v. 
Moronqo Unified School District, 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991) and 
California Teachers Association v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 
24See analogous State constitutional provisions attached in 
Attachment R-2. 
25See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 
(1983) . 
260n page 26 of its Brief, the Separationists contend that 
"[t]he courts in these states [with provisions similar to Article 
I, Section 4] have upheld the rigorous language of state 
provisions and have repeatedly enforced and [sic] the strict no-
aid mandates." This contention is totally unsubstantiated. 
While a few courts from other states have ruled that prayer at 
high school graduations violate those particular state's 
constitutional provisions (with other courts ruling to the 
contrary) these decisions come nowhere close to the 
Separationists' overwrought generalization. 
27Research has disclosed only one other case anywhere in the 
United States challenging municipal prayer practices and that was 
under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Marsa v. 
Wernik, 86 N.J. 232, 430 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1981) cert, den'd 454 
U.S. 958 (1981). Even though Marsa was decided before Marsh, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the practice of prayer under an 
analysis very similar to that discussed in Point VI, below. 
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1981) are completely irrelevant to the issue before this Court, 
In Riles, the Supreme Court of California found that the practice 
of lending, without charge, textbooks used in public schools to 
students attending parochial schools violated the California 
constitutional provision against supporting sectarian or 
denominational schools. (California Constitution, Article IX, 
§8.) This "support of sectarian schools" provision is of no 
benefit to the Separationists in the case now before this Court 
because of totally different constitutional provision and 
operative facts.28 
In Sands, the California Supreme Court held that high school 
graduation ceremony prayers violated the establishment clause of 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 
California Supreme Court was also asked to consider whether 
graduation school prayer violated various provisions of the 
California Constitution. Three justices concluded that the 
practice violated the State Constitution, two concluded that it 
did not, and two declined to reach the state constitutional 
issues. (Jd. at 833, Chief Justice Lucas, concurring).29 
28This same weakness also applies to government sponsored 
religious display cases cited by the Separationists, Fox v. City 
of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978) and Okrand v. City of 
Los Angeles, 207 Cal.App.3d 566 (Cal.Ct.App. 1989). 
(Separationists, p. 39.) 
29Under the constitutional law of California, the three 
justice opinion was not binding even in California. Id., citing: 
County of San Mateo v. Del J., 46 Cal.3d 1236, 1241-1242, fn. 5 & 
1249-50, 762 P.2d 1202; Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674, 
679, 59 P.2d 144 (1936); and, Farrell v. Board of Trustees, 85 
Cal. 408, 415-416, 24 P. 868 (1890). 
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More importantly, the California Supreme Court in Sands went 
out of its way to distinguish the "legislative prayer" tradition 
approved in Marsh v. Chambers, supra, from graduation prayer. As 
the three Justice opinion of Justice Kennard noted: 
Marsh, . . . is properly understood as deriving in part 
from the judiciary's deference to the legislative 
branch in the management of that branch's own internal 
affairs (see Van Zandt v. Thompson, (7th Cir. 1988) 839 
F.2d 1215, 1219), a deference not implicated in this 
case. 
Sands, supra at 819, fn. 9. (Emphasis added.)30 
Of course, in the instant case, the judiciary's deference to 
the legislative branch is. at issue. This Court must take every 
reasonable step possible to uphold the actions of a co-equal 
branch of government and presume such actions to be 
constitutional, unless the Separationists show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such actions are unconstitutional. (See 
Point I, above.) The Separationists and the ACLU have not met 
this burden. 
Similar weaknesses infect the ACLU's and the Separationists' 
reliance on cases from the State of Washington. The 
constitutional provisions in Washington related to religion have 
been extensively analyzed by Washington Supreme Court Justice, 
Robert F. Utter and University of Georgia Professor Edward J. 
Larsen, in: Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the 
Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 
30See the discussion of the relationship between Marsh and 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. , 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) at fn. 44 
below. 
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Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 451 (1988) ("Church and 
State"). Justice Utter and Professor Larsen begin their analysis 
by noting, similar to the discussion in Point III above, that 
there is an on-going scholarly dispute regarding the principles 
of state constitutional interpretation. (Church and State, p. 
452-58.) Without reciting the analysis in it full detail, 
certain basic principles apply in both Washington and Utah. For 
example, the article noted: 
Constitutional interpretations inevitably involve some 
consideration of the intent of the Framers. As a 
practical matter, the history behind the provisions of 
the Constitution influences constitutional 
interpretation even if it does not control it. 
(Id. at 455, footnotes omitted, emphasis added.) 
Under Washington law, state courts must construe the 
words of the state constitution according to their 
common and ordinary meaning at the time the particular 
provision was adopted. Courts must look to the meaning 
that the words would have had to the vast majority of 
ordinary voters, not merely to the drafters. 
(Id. at 457-58, footnotes omitted, emphasis added.) 
Justice Utter and Professor Larsen then proceed to analyze 
the history behind Washington's Article I, Section 11, the direct 
ancestor of Utah's similar provision at issue here. Beyond any 
doubt, Justice Utter and Professor Larsen establish that 
Washington's Article I, Section 11 was placed in the State's 
Constitution at the insistence of United States Congress to 
restrict the establishment of sectarian schools and not as a 
manifestation as hostility toward religion generally. (Church 
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and State, p. 472.)31 Specifically, discussing the clause at 
issue in this lawsuit (no public financing for any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction), Justice Utter and Professor 
Larsen recognized the clause as "address[ing] the basic objective 
of • . . preventing state funding for parochial education 
activities." (JW.) 
Church and State analyses the provision as follows: 
[The drafter of an earlier amendment] had no intended 
this objective to reflect a hostility toward religion. 
Given the debate on the preamble, neither did the 
convention. 
(Id. at 473, footnotes omitted.) 
Justice Utter and Professor Larsen then conclude their 
analysis of the relationship between the Washington State 
Constitution and religion with language instructive to this 
Court: 
Far from being hostile to religion, the framers viewed 
religion as an important component of a stable society. 
They voted overwhelmingly to express gratitude to the 
deity for their liberties. They authorized tax 
exemptions for church property. They declined to 
prohibit religious influence in public education. In 
each instance, delegates spoke warmly of religion as 
setting an example for youth, contributing a positive 
moral force to society, and providing a welcome 
positive influence for students. Yet, they were 
exceedingly careful to purify this state-sanctioned 
religion from any taint of sectarianism. Rather than 
accept a reference to God in the preamble, as some 
proposed, they hailed instead a generic Supreme Ruler 
of the Universe. Public support for sectarian 
activities such as religious worship, exercise, and 
instruction was prohibited. Sectarian control and 
influence was forever barred from public schools. In 
31In fact, the Washington Constitutional Convention 
expressly rejected a "freedom from religion" provision 
recommended to it by a prominent local newspaper. (Id.) 
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distinguishing between religion and sectarianism in the 
schools, the framers comported with the 50-year-old 
common school movement. 
(Id. at 477-8, footnotes omitted, emphasis added.) 
Given this clear constitutional history, the Washington 
school assistance cases cited by the ACLU and the Separationists 
simply cannot be read to support an argument rendering the City 
Council's practice of prayer unconstitutional in this case. In 
light of Washington's own constitutional history, the holdings in 
the cases cited by the Separationists and the ACLU are far from 
surprising. It is also predictable from this analysis that the 
Washington Legislature's opening prayers and those of Washington 
cities like Spokane are constitutional.32 
In Witters v. State Commission for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 
(Wash. 1989),33 the Supreme Court of Washington considered 
whether or not the State was required or allowed to provide 
financial assistance for a visually handicapped student. The 
student wanted to attend a private Bible College with the goal of 
becoming a pastor, missionary or church youth director. The 
support was challenged as violating the Washington constitutional 
provision prohibiting any public money from being applied to 
32See pp. 12 and 31 of City Council's Brief and Exhibits 
"X", MY" and "Z" below (R. 791-804) documenting Washington's 
historical and current practice of legislative prayer. 
33Cited by the ACLU at p. 13; the Separationists at pp. 9 
and 29. 
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religious instruction. Washington Constitution, Article 1, 
§11.3A The Washington Supreme Court concluded, rather 
obviously, that providing state financial assistance to attend a 
Bible College constituted support of "religious . . . 
instruction." 
In the instant case, the Salt Lake City Council is not 
providing any appropriations for any similar religious 
instruction to an individual or an institution. In fact, it is 
undisputed that there is no appropriation at all and that the 
Council's Opening Ceremony involves broad community 
participation, including non-religious thoughts and 
meditations.35 Even a "prayer's" content is specifically 
outside of Council concern. (See the Policy included as 
Attachment "1" to the Council Members' original Brief.) Thus, 
there is no similarity of either the facts or the constitutional 
issues involved between Witters and the case now before this 
Court. 
Another case cited by the ACLU and the Separationists from 
Washington is similarly unavailing. In Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 
3AThe 1989 Witters decision of the Washington Supreme Court 
followed a remand from the United States Supreme Court in Witters 
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 
88 L.Ed.2d 846 (1986), where the United States Supreme Court 
decided that such payments did not violate the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
35It is interesting to note that the Separationists, which 
admitted at oral argument on this matter below, that the City 
Council's expenditures were de minimis, has somehow now abandoned 
this de minimis standard when referencing the judgment rendered 
against individual Council Members below. 
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973 (Wash. 1973),36 the Washington Supreme Court held that 
statutes providing financial assistance for needy and 
disadvantaged children attending private schools violated the 
provisions of Article IX, §4 of the Washington Constitution, 
which prohibits public funds from being spent on schools with 
"sectarian control or influence." Such a conclusion, under a 
completely different constitutional provision, is irrelevant to 
the case before this Court. In fact, the Washington Supreme 
Court declined to consider whether or not the challenged practice 
violated Article 1, §11 of the Washington Constitution (the 
progenitor of Article I, §4 of the Utah Constitution), upon which 
the Separationists base their challenge here. Weiss, supra at 
977.37 
Finally, the Separationists and the ACLU rely on Kay v. 
David Douglas School District No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or.App. 
1986).38 However, Kay proves far more than the Separationists 
or the ACLU desire. Again, Kay involved a challenge to high 
school graduation ceremonial prayer. The Oregon Court of Appeals 
held that such prayer violated Article I, §§2 and 5 of the Oregon 
Constitution. Oregon's Article I, Section 2 reads: 
All men shall be secure in the Natural right, to 
36Separationists, pp. 28 and 30. 
37The school busing cases from Washington relied upon by the 
Separationists are also unhelpful for the same reasons. Mitchell 
v. Consolidated School District No. 201, 135 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1943) 
and Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District No. 506, 207 P.2d 
198 (Wash. 1949). (Separationists, p. 9.) 
38Separationists, pp. 9 and 40; ACLU, p. 10. 
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worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their 
own consciences. 
Explicitly relying upon history from the Oregon Constitutional 
Convention, and acknowledging that Article I, §2 went a step 
beyond "other constitutions" in effecting a separation of church 
and state, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that graduation 
prayer violated this "complete divorce" of church and state. 
Id., 880, fn. 6. Thus, contrary to the urgings of the 
Separationists and the ACLU on this Court, Oregon expressly 
considered the history of the constitutional provision at issue. 
Further, Article I, §5 of the Oregon Constitution (a rough 
analog to Article I, §4 of the Utah Constitution) contains a most 
interesting difference from Utah's Constitution. A clause which 
is not found in Utah's Constitution specifically prohibits: 
Any money befinql appropriated for the payment of any 
reliqeous fsicl service in either house of the 
Legislative Assembly. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Utah, in adopting its Constitution, could have adopted the 
Oregon model with its specific prohibition on legislative prayer. 
Instead, Utah chose to adopt the Washington provision which has 
no such specific provision. It must be presumed that this choice 
was done advisedly.39 As such, this conscious omission adds 
weight to the conclusion that Utah's Article I, §4 was designed 
to permit Utah's longstanding practice from prayers in opening 
'Hanson v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980). 
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legislative sessions, both at municipal and state levels/0' 
The most telling weakness of the Separationists' and the 
ACLU's position is the fact that they must attempt to analogize 
from other state constitutions concerning school graduation 
prayer cases which is simply not at issue here. Marsh 
conclusively demonstrates that the practice of legislative prayer 
is more than common; it is the norm in state and local 
governments across the country and has been for 200 years. As 
demonstrated in ACLU's own Brief's Appendix, and Attachment "2" 
of this Brief, virtually every state has constitutional language 
substantially similar and, in many cases more stringent, than 
Utah's Article I, Section 4.42 Yet, despite this fact, and the 
long history of legislative prayer, there exists no case squarely 
on point prohibiting it. The cases from which the Separationists 
and the ACLU attempt to analogize all concern different subjects, 
different constitutional provisions and embody different 
40This omission of Oregon's explicit prohibition on 
legislative religious activity is further evidence of the 
weakness of the ACLU's argument that "almost every imaginable 
protection for religious freedom and injunction against the union 
of church and state has been included. ..." (R. 578.) 
Obviously, with all due respect to Professor Mazor who wrote the 
article cited by the ACLU for this proposition, the Professor had 
apparently failed to read the Oregon Constitution. See, Note, 
Notes on a Bill of Rights, 1969 Utah L.Rev. 326, 331. 
41
 (See, e.g., Hickman at p. 72, Appendix "1" to the Council 
Members' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, discussing 
the Utah Constitutional Convention's practice of adopting 
provisions almost verbatim after studying the models from the 
"northwest states"; R. 265.) 
A2See, also, "Be No More Children", supra, and the 
analytical table in Section III(A), p. . 
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historical and legal backgrounds. None is precedent for the 
issue before this Court. The long silence and lack of contrary 
opinion regarding this tradition, in fact, speaks volumes in 
favor of its validity.43 
POINT V 
MARSH IS NOT A "NARROW EXEMPTION" BUT INSTEAD 
A FULLY APPLICABLE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION 
WHICH SUPPORTS THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION. 
Looking at cases construing analogous federal constitutional 
provisions for guidance, as necessary under the appropriate 
methodology of constitutional analysis required here, this Court 
must turn to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 
(1983). The Separationists and the ACLU attempt to characterize 
Marsh as a "careful exception" to the reach of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment and only applicable to state 
legislatures. (Separationists, p. 23; ACLU, p. 20. )A4 The 
A3It is interesting to note that in their Brief the 
Separationists rely on three Utah cases interpreting Article I, 
Section 4 now claiming that the analysis in these cases supports 
their position. (Separationists, pp. 42-48; citing Manning v. 
Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 305, 517 P.2d 549 (Utah 1983); Gubler 
v. Utah State Teachers Retirement, 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580 
(1948); and, Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 
197 P.2d 477 (1948)). In argument to the lower court the 
Separationists took a contrary position stating: "[t]here is no 
helpful case law in Utah construing Art. I, §4 of the Utah 
Constitution." (R.714.) As noted in the Council Members' 
original Brief (pp. 35-38) Thomas, Manning and Gubler support the 
Council Members' position here. 
4AThe ACLU wrongly cites Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. , 120 
L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) as expressly restricting Marsh to "state 
legislative bodies." (ACLU, p. 20, fn. 14.) Counsel for the 
Council Members has diligently scoured the Lee opinion (including 
running a computer search) and such a purported quote is nowhere 
to be found in the opinion. Instead, the Supreme Court in Lee 
distinguished Marsh based upon the formal structural distinctions 
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Separationists and the ACLU would have this Court believe that 
all that the United States Supreme Court held in Marsh was that a 
long tradition of violating the Constitution was somehow immune 
from challenge. 
This reading of Marsh is wrong because the ACLU and the 
Separationists simply misstate the case. Marsh is not a "careful 
exception" to the First Amendment, despite arguments in the 
dissent to that effect.45 Rather, Marsh is a classic example of 
the use of historical precedent to determine the intent and 
purpose of the Framers of the Constitution. 
As noted in Point III above, the primary rule of 
constitutional interpretation, for both the Federal and State 
Constitutions, is to ascertain the intent and purpose of the 
drafters of a constitutional provision and the electorate in 
between a state legislative opening session and a school 
graduation ceremony. The Court stated: 
The atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state 
legislature where adults are free to enter and leave 
with little comment and for any number of reasons 
cannot compare with the constraining potential of the 
one school event most important for the student to 
attend. 
Lee, 505 U.S. at , 120 L.Ed.2d at 487. Obviously, sessions 
of the Salt Lake City Council are more closely analogous to the 
state legislature, with adults free to enter and leave with 
little comment pursuant to a scheduled agenda, as opposed to the 
unique culminating nature of a high school graduation. (See, 
Fact No. 19, Council Members' original Brief, p. 9.) 
45The weakness of the Separationists' analysis of Marsh is 
demonstrated by the fact that in their ten citations to Marsh 
nine of them are from the dissent. The Separationists appear to 
forget that it is the majority opinion which provides the 
applicable federal analogue here; not the dissent. 
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adopting it. The question which thus faced the Court in Marsh 
was whether or not the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment was intended by its Framers to prohibit legislative 
prayers. 
In interpreting the Establishment Clause, the Court looked 
to the traditional interpretation given the Establishment Clause 
by its Framers. The Supreme Court did not hold, and the City 
Council has not argued in the case, that a long tradition of 
violating the Constitution would be protected. Instead, the 
Supreme Court held in Marsh that the Establishment Clause, when 
interpreted in light of its intent and purposes as demonstrated 
by historical usage and the Framers' understanding, simply did 
not apply to the challenged ceremonial prayers. The majority in 
Marsh clearly stated: 
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify 
contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees, 
but there is far more here than simply historical 
patterns. In this context, historical evidence sheds 
light not only on what the draftsman intended the 
Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they 
thought the Clause applied to the practice authorized 
by the First Congress - their actions reveal their 
intent. 
Id. at 790. (Emphasis added.)46 
Because the ACLU has mischaracterized Marsh as an 
"exception", as opposed to simple case of constitutional 
A6See the Council Members' original Brief at p. 35 for a 
discussion of the interpretative effect of the fact that members 
of the United States Constitutional Convention were involved in 
the First Congresses' prayer practice as were members of Utah's 
Constitutional Convention with the first Utah Legislature's 
practice of prayer. 
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"interpretation", the ACLU then makes the argument that this 
"exception" is not applicable only to a state legislature and not 
to the Salt Lake City Council. The syllogism is faulty because 
its major premise (Marsh as an "exception" rather than simply an 
"interpretation" of inapplicability) is faulty.47 It is also 
faulty because it is premised on their erroneous assumption that 
elected City legislators are not entitled to the same respect at 
law as is their State contemporaries.48 
To the best of the City's knowledge, and neither the 
Separationists nor the ACLU has cited cases to the contrary, no 
court in the country has ruled that municipal ceremonial prayer 
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment nor any 
analogous state constitutional provision.49 Moreover, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized in Marsh that prayers have 
been traditionally offered before more than just state 
legislatures. As part of the Supreme Court's recognition of that 
tradition the Court noted: 
47The same syllogistic error infects the Separationists' 
claim that the City Council is not entitled to a "traditional" 
"exemption" because of an interruption in the City Council's 
practice of prayer. (Separationists, pp. 22-24.) The Council 
Members are not trying to "legalize" any constitutionally 
impermissible activity. The relevant historical practices of the 
Territorial Legislature, Constitutional Convention, State 
Legislature and the early history of Great Salt Lake City clearly 
establish that ceremonial prayers opening legislative sessions 
simply were not intended to be prohibited by Article I, Section 
4. 
48See ACLU Brief, Point I and the Council Members' response, 
Point I, supra. 
49See discussion of Marsa v. Wernik, supra, above. 
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The opening of sessions of legislative and other 
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in 
the history and tradition of this country. 
Id at 7 86. (Emphasis added.) 
Because the Council Members are not claiming that the 
State's long tradition of prayer somehow "exempts" them from 
complying with the First Amendment or with Article I, Section 4 
of the Utah Constitution, the analysis for the Separationists and 
the ACLU is inappropriate and erroneous. 
POINT VI 
THE ACLU'S PSEUDO-LEMON ANALYSIS IS INCORRECT. 
Before the lower court the ACLU attempted to rely, through 
the use of various mis-citations, on the tests concerning the 
First Amendment separation of Church and State found in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed.2d 745, reh'g den'd 404 U.S. 876 
(1971). (R. 584-90.) In their Brief to this Court, the ACLU 
omits literally any reference to Lemon. However, the ACLU's 
Points IV, V and VI, surreptitiously attempt to track their Lemon 
analysis below. The Council Members will, therefore, 
specifically analyze the Lemon tests. 
The three famous tests are found in Lemon at pp. 612 and 
613. A governmental action will not be held to violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment if: 
1. The [action] has a secular purpose; 
2. The [action's] principal or primary effect is not 
one that either advances or inhibits religion; and, 
3. The [action] does not foster an excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion. 
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(Citations omitted.) This Point will discuss these three Lemon 
tests individually.50 
A. 
THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION SERVES LEGITIMATE 
AND EXPRESSED SECULAR PURPOSES. 
Without any supporting authority, the ACLU boldly claims 
that M[p]rayer is, by any objective standard, a religious 
exercise." (ACLU, p. 9.) Therefore, the ACLU claims, prayer is 
an ipso facto violation of Article I, Section 4. The Utah 
Legislature, which has continued to pray from the very first day 
of its existence (and which inherited this practice from the 
Territorial Legislature and Constitutional Convention) obviously 
does not believe that prayer is a "religious exercise" that 
violates the Constitution. The Washington State legislature and 
the City Council of Spokane, which both regularly pray, also 
apparently do not believe that their practice violates the 
Constitution of Washington and, apparently, neither did the 
Washington Constitutional Convention which also prayed. (See 
Fact No. 25 in the Council Members' original Brief referencing 
Exhibits "X", "Y" and "Z" below; R. 791-804.) 
While prayer may have some definitional components of 
religious activity in the dictionary, that fact is not the Lemon 
test. Lemon does not say that an action of government cannot 
have some incidental effect on religion. What Lemon says is that 
if the government action in question has a secular purpose, it 
50The analysis in Marsa v. Wernik, supra, is similar to that 
outlined below. 
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will be upheld under the first prong of the Lemon test. The 
Supreme Court clearly stated: 
fTIhe statutes themselves clearly state that they are 
intended to enhance the quality of the secular 
education in all schools covered by the compulsory 
attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the 
legislatures meant anything else. . . . As in f Board 
of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)] we find 
nothing here that undermines the stated legislative 
intent; it must therefore be accorded appropriate 
deference. 
Id. at 613. (Emphasis added.) 
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court went even further in explaining 
its deference to the secular purpose specified by the government 
in support of its actions: 
The Court has invalidated legislation or governmental 
action on the ground that a secular purpose was 
lacking, but only when it was concluded that there was 
no question that the statute or activity was motivated 
wholly by religious considerations. . . . Even where 
the benefits to religion were substantial . . . we saw 
a secular purpose and no conflict with the 
Establishment Clause. 
Id. at 680. (Extensive string citations omitted, emphasis 
added.) 
The City Council's opening ceremony policy recites numerous 
bona fide secular purposes as the reason for its adoption. These 
include providing a moment during which Council Membesrs and the 
audience can reflect on the importance of the business before the 
Council; promoting an atmosphere of civility; encouraging lofty 
thought and high-mindedness; recognizing cultural diversity; and 
fostering sensitivity for and recognizing the uniqueness of all 
segments of the community. (See Attachment "1" to the Council 
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Members' original Brief.) These specified secular purposes are 
sufficient to pass the first Lemon test, as further explicated in 
Lynch..51 Obviously, the City Council tradition is not followed 
"wholly [for] religious consideration." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680. 
B. 
THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION DOES NOT HAVE THE 
PRINCIPAL OR PRIMARY EFFECT OF ADVANCING OR 
INHIBITING RELIGION. 
The City Council policy expresses its "primary" purposes as 
being those which are specified immediately above. The balancing 
of effects and intents stated and expressed by the City Council 
in support of its opening ceremony policy must be given great 
deference and presumed constitutional. (See Point I.) 
It is not enough under Lemon for the Separationists and the 
ACLU to merely show that some of the prayers offered by the City 
Council have some religious importance. The test under Lemon is 
whether these brief religious references have the "primary" or 
"principal" effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. In 
considering this second prong of the Lemon test, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged what the ACLU refuses to admit. 
That is, that there is no "bright line" or simple analysis. See, 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678-9. 
The Court has, instead, weighed the religious effects of a 
51The ACLU appears to argue for some constitutional "least 
entangling alternative". (ACLU, p. 16-17.) As noted by Lynch 
and Lemon, there is no "least entangling alternative" 
requirement. Instead, the Court must and will look to the 
legitimate expressed secular purpose and not impose its own 
judgment as to any lesser alternatives on a co-equal branch of 
government. 
37 
governmental action against the other effects of the action and 
against other religious interactions which have previously been 
approved. 
In this context the Supreme Court has recognized that: 
[tjhere is an unbroken history of official 
acknowledgment by all three branches of government of 
the role of religion in American life from at least 
1789. 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674. In Lynch, the United States Supreme 
Court traced this "unbroken history" of governmental actions 
which indisputably advance, support, endorse and approve religion 
and none of which have been held unconstitutional. These actions 
include statements by the United States Supreme Court such as 
that in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313, 96 L.Ed. 954 
(1953): 
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose 
a Supreme Being. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Additionally, the Court in Lynch quoted President 
Roosevelt's 1944 Proclamation of Thanksgiving referencing our 
"Heavenly Father", our "Almighty God" and our "Holy Scriptures". 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675, fn. 3. Lynch noted that such 
proclamations are not limited to President Roosevelt, but have 
also been issued by several other Presidents. Additionally, 
Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National Day of 
Prayer each year "on which rdavl the people of the United States 
may turn to God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, 
and as individuals." 36 U.S.C. §169h (emphasis added). 
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Presidents have also issued proclamations and messages to 
commemorate, for example, Jewish Heritage Week and Jewish High 
Holy Days. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677. 
Of course, our statutorily prescribed national motto is "In 
God We Trust", 36 U.S.C. §186, which was mandated to be included 
on our currency. 31 U.S.C. §5112(d)(l). The Supreme Court also 
noted that the National Gallery in Washington: 
[m]aintained with government support . . . has long 
exhibited masterpieces with religious messages, notably 
the Last Supper, and paintings depicting the Birth of 
Christ, the Crucifixion and the Resurrection, among 
many others with explicit Christian themes and 
messages. 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677. (Footnote omitted.) 
The Supreme Court also noted that every argument heard 
before it is done under a painting which is a permanent symbol of 
religion: Moses with the Ten Commandments. _Ici. Of course, the 
Federal courts hear all their cases and proceeding opened with an 
announcement that concludes "God save the United States and this 
Honorable Court." Marsh, 463 U.S. 786. Similarly, in Anderson 
v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit approved the 
Ten Commandments monolith on the public property outside the 
courtroom where this case was argued to the District Court. 
If none of the activities cited above violated the Lemon 
"primary effect" test it is impossible to argue seriously that 
the City Council's occasional inclusion of brief ceremonial 
prayers, moments of reflection, invocations or other opening 
thoughts can have as their "primary effect" the unconstitutional 
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advancement or inhibition of religion. 
THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION DOES NOT CREATE AN 
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT. 
The most ambiguous of the three Lemon tests is the 
"entanglement" test. In beginning the analysis of 
"entanglement", this Court should start at the same place that 
the United States Supreme Court started its "entanglement" 
analysis in Lemon: 
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation 
between church and state; total separation is not 
possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship 
between government and religious organizations is 
inevitable. 
* * * 
Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize 
that the wall of separation, far from being a "wall," 
is a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending 
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship. 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added). 
Lemon went on to hold that entanglement must be examined on 
three standards: 
1. The character and purposes of the institutions that 
are benefitted; 
2. The nature of the aid that the State provides; and 
3. The resulting relationship between the government 
and the religious authority. 
Id. at 615. Taking those three subtests individually, it is 
52Ironically, the Separationists and the ACLU's use of the 
public property and funds of this Court in advancing this lawsuit 
to silence the expression of religious diversity clearly does 
have as its "primary effect" the inhibition, or at least the 
attempted inhibition, of religion. 
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clear that the City Council tradition does not create an 
excessive "entanglement". 
First, no single religious institution is "benefitted" by 
the City Council practice of allowing occasional prayers, on an 
ecumenical basis, as part of an opening ceremony. To find 
entanglement, this Court would be required to find that the 
occasional practice of prayer more directly benefits the 
institutions of religion than: 
[ejxpenditure of large sums of public money for 
textbooks supplied throughout the country to students 
attending church sponsored schools . . . , expenditure 
of public funds for transportation of students to 
church-sponsored schools . . . , federal grants for 
college buildings of church-sponsored institutions of 
higher education combining secular and religious 
education . . . noncategorical grants to church-
sponsored colleges and universities . . • , and [ ] 
tax exemptions for church properties . . . . It would 
also require that we view it as more of an endorsement 
of religion than the Sunday Closing Laws . . . , the 
release time program for religious training, and the 
legislative prayers [all of which have been upheld] 
Id. at 681-2. (Citations omitted.) The benefit to religion in 
this case would also need to be greater than the Supreme Court's 
approval of a Christmas creche in Lynch. 
The same analysis and comparisons apply to the second 
subportion of the entanglement test - investigating the "nature 
of the aid that the State provides . . . ." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 
615. Again relying on Lynch, the City Council tradition is not 
improperly aiding a religion. 
fWlhatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all 
religions, is indirect, remote, and incidental: display 
of the Creche is no more an advancement or endorsement 
of religion than the Congressional and Executive 
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recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as 
"Christs Mass" or the exhibition of literally hundreds 
of religious paintings in governmentally supported 
museums. 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683. (Emphasis added.) 
Concerning the third subtest of the "entanglement" 
analysis - the resulting relationship between government and 
religion - the ACLU has completely misunderstood what the Supreme 
Court was aiming to prevent. The ACLU went into exhaustive 
detail below as to the efforts necessary by the City to 
coordinate the offering of prayer (viz. preparing agendas, 
distributing guidelines, etc.). (R. 587-8.) The ACLU claimed 
that this established some "entangling" involvement of the State 
in monitoring or overseeing religious affairs. 
In fact, it does nothing of the kind. The City Council is 
not injecting itself in any way into the affairs of a religion. 
Instead, the City Council is merely monitoring its own affairs. 
There is no "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing 
surveillance" of a religion by the City Council required by 
allowing occasional prayers. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. 
Thus, the City Council tradition meets all of the three 
subtests of "entanglement". No religious institutions are 
improperly "benefitted" by the City Council practice. No 
improper aid is provided to any religion. Finally, there is no 
"surveillance" or "monitoring" of a religion by the City Council. 
The ACLU is, therefore, left with relying on yet another 
variation of the "entanglement" test - "divisiveness". (ACLU, p. 
18-20.) The ACLU appears to claim that simply because suits have 
42 
recently been brought against school prayer and, City Council 
prayers and legislative committees are studying potential 
constitutional amendments, therefore, they argue that the 
practice of prayer is so divisive as to automatically be 
"entanglement". Unfortunately for the ACLU, the United States 
Supreme Court has held directly to the contrary. 
A litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a 
lawsuit, however, create the appearance of divisiveness 
and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement. 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-5. 
In ruling that the creche in Lynch was not so "divisive" as 
to mandate a finding of "entanglement", the Supreme Court relied 
on a forty year "calm history" "marked by no apparent 
dissention". JA. at 684, quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 525 F.Supp. 
1150, 1179 (D.R.I. 1981). In the instant case, the City 
Council's tradition of prayer began with its direct ancestor, the 
City Council of Great Salt Lake City, in 1851. With the 
exception of a few objections by the individual plaintiffs in 
1981, and now this lawsuit, there is nothing to disturb the "calm 
history" of the City Council tradition. Further, the City 
Council tradition is mirrored in the "calm history" of the Utah 
Legislature, the Utah Constitutional Convention and, before both 
of these, the Territorial Legislature dating to 1847. 
"Divisiveness" in this case appears to be mostly in the minds of 
the Separationists and the ACLU. Such "bootstrapping" should not 
be sanctioned by this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case requires this Court to address serious 
constitutional issues of the highest magnitude. As demonstrated 
by the Council Members' original Brief and this Reply Brief, the 
lower court's Order must be reversed for numerous significant 
constitutional violations. 
First, the lower court's Order fails to give the required 
deference and presumption of constitutionality to the acts of a 
co-equal branch of government, the legislative body of the Salt 
Lake City Council. 
Secondly, the lower court's Order (apparently now conceded 
by the Separationists) improperly violated the elected City 
legislators' individual legislative absolute immunity from suit 
and their Speech and Debate Privilege. 
Third, the lower court improperly adopted a rule of 
legislative construction (the "plain meaning rule"), as fully 
applicable to the far different task of construing the provisions 
of a Constitution. This Court has long recognized that 
constitutional analysis requires a far more sophisticated 
evaluation to determine the original intent and purpose of a 
constitutional provision, as drafted by the Framers of the 
provision and adopted by the electorate• 
Finally, because of the other errors mentioned above, this 
Court must investigate the relationship of not just City Council 
prayer, but also the entire panoply of religious invocation and 
symbolism under the provisions of Article I, Section 4 of the 
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Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 4 must be analyzed in 
light of its historical intent and purpose, as demonstrated by 
the long history of prayer in the United States; Utah, beginning 
with the Territorial Legislature; Great Salt Lake City, 
continuing through the Constitutional Convention; the State 
Legislature; and, Salt Lake City. It is clear from this study, 
that the intent and purpose of the framers of Article I, Section 
4 could not possibly have included the prohibition of legislative 
ceremonial prayer. 
The Order of the lower court must be reversed. This Court 
should specifically reaffirm the constitutional presumptions to 
which municipal legislative acts are entitled. It should affirm 
that the legislative members of the Salt Lake City Council are 
entitled to absolute legislative immunity and their Speech and 
Debate Privileges. It should affirm that constitutional analysis 
requires a sophisticated consideration of intent and purpose. 
Finally, this Court should affirm that Article I, Section 4 
does not manifest an unbending hostility towards religion which, 
prohibits an important long standing tradition and practice of 
the Salt Lake City Council, the Utah State Legislature and 
numerous other cities, towns and counties throughout Utah. 
Respectfully submitted this *Q day of November, 1992. 
City Attorney 
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^WJCE R. BAIRD ~ 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
to Brian M. Barnard and John Pace, Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 214 
East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204; two copies to 
Kathryn D. Kendell, Legal Counsel for American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation of Utah, Inc., Amicus Curiae, Boston Building 
#419, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; one copy to Paul T. Morris and 
I. Robert Wall, Attorneys for West Valley City, 3600 Constitution 
Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah 84119; and one copy to Paul D. 
Lyman and David L. Church, Attorneys for Utah League of Cities & 
Towns, 250 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701, by 
depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this 
BRB:cc 
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ATTACHMENT " 1 " 
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DAT£~ 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JOHN PACE USB # 5624 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF 
SEPARATIONISTS, INC., 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS; 
and J. WALKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS, 
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM 
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and 
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake 
City Council 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
OBJECTION & MOTION 
FOR CLARIFICATION 
Civil NO. 91-090-6136 CV 
(Hon. J.D. FREDERICK) 
PLAINTIFFS, by and through their counsel, BRIAN M. 
BARNARD, respond to defendants' memorandum (hereinafter 
"Objection Memo"), OBJECTION to proposed order and MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION all dated March 11, 1992 as follows: 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION 
Defendants' Feigned Ignorance 
Defendants feign ignorance as to what is a "prayer." 
Objection Memo, pp. 1 - 5 . Defendants have some idea as to 
what constitutes a "prayer" in that they recited in their 
pleadings and post-suit guidelines dealing with thoughts/ 
readings/invocations that there has been a one hundred and 
forty (140+) years tradition of prayer at City Council 
meetings. Page 1, October 17, 1991, Guidelines regarding 
"Thoughts/Readings/ Invocations" to be used as part of 
opening ceremonies for City Council meetings (copy attached 
to this memorandum as Exhibit "0"). 
Defendants express (Objection Memo, p. 2) concern that 
this Court has adopted the Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary, 1979, p. 896, definition of prayer: "an address 
as a petition to God or a god in word or thought;" "the act 
or practice of praying to God or a god" as cited by 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memorandum, p. 15. 
That definition of prayer is commonly used and accepted; if 
the court sees fit to include a definition in its order, such 
a definition would not be inappropriate. 
2 
Post-Suit Guidelines 
After this lawsuit was filed, but before the summary 
judgment was granted, defendants on October 17, 1991, adopted 
certain guidelines regarding "Thoughts/Readings/Invocations" 
to be used as part of opening ceremonies for City Council 
meetings. Exhibit fl0,f attached. Defendants now request 
(Objection Memo, pp. 7-8) that this court examine each 
element of those guidelines and determine which elements are 
prohibited as "prayers." Because those guidelines were 
adopted after this suit was filed as a defense strategy1, the 
Court should not consider the contents of those guidelines. 
Plaintiffs' complaint made no claim against said guidelines. 
Plaintiffs have never suggested that thoughts or 
readings, in and of themselves, are prohibited by Art. I, § 
4; and, no such claim or allegation is before the Court.2 
Said guidelines also encourage and allow "invocations." 
Exhibit "0". By definition "invocations" are religious in 
1
 The guidelines acknowledge that "thoughts" and 
"readings" are something new added to the opening ceremony 
plan in 1991. Policy, p. 2, 5 I (B) (6), Exhibit "0" 
attached. Previously only prayers or invocations had been 
part of the opening ceremonies. 
2
 Needless to say, if a thought or reading presented 
as part of the Council's agenda constitutes "religious 
worship, exercise or instruction" then it is prohibited by 
Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
3 
nature. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979, p. 602, 
defines invocation as: "the act or process of petitioning 
for help or support;" "an invocatory prayer as at the 
beginning of a service or worship." Defendants acknowledge 
that the invocations to be offered before the Court will 
involve religion. Exhibit "0", especially last page. In 
addition to using the word "prayer" in the proposed order, 
the Court might specifically prohibit "invocations" as 
referred to by defendants in Exhibit "0." 
Common usage as to what is a "prayer" would suffice for 
defendants to know what the Court prohibits. For added 
guidance, defendants might read the language of Art. I, § 4, 
Utah Constitution, prohibiting govenment sponsored "religious 
worship, exercise or instruction" and note that what occurred 
on September 10, 1991 as recited in plaintiffs' complaint 
clearly falls within that prohibition. 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION 
Defendants' motion for clarification amounts to a 
request for an advisory opinion by this Court. Defendants 
ask this court to determine whether certain proposed 
hypothetical conduct violates Art. I, § 4 of the Utah 
4 
Constitution, when the conduct is not before the Court and 
when the conduct has not been challenged by plaintiffs. 
There is no case or controversy before this Court as to 
defendants singing patriotic songs, mentioning the word God, 
reading from dollar bills or historical documents, 
administering oaths "so help you God,"3 a private citizen 
reciting the Lord's prayer during a Council meeting but not 
as part of the agenda, etc. Defendants offer no evidence 
that these incidents have occurred or will occur in the 
future and plaintiffs have not asked this Court to speculate 
that such things might occur. 
Plaintiffs have not suggested in this action that any 
of the foregoing hypothetical acts violate Art. I, § 4 of the 
3
 Defendants make mention of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-24-17 
& 18 & 19 (1953 as amended) which proscribe forms of oaths 
for witnesses to include the phrase "so help you God." 
Defendants failed to note that those statutes provide 
for an alternative: "You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that 
the evidence you shall give . . . shall be the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God (or, 
under the pains and penalties of perjury.)11 Emphasis added. 
Id. 
The alternative offered in those statutes is worthy of 
note; it is non-religious in nature, however it accomplishes 
the same goals — the witness has noted the solemnity of the 
occasion, entered into an obligation and can be punished for 
failing to tell the truth. 
Thus, the Salt Lake City Council need not be concerned 
(Objection Memo, p. 5) about whether the use of such an oath 
violates the Utah Constitution because the Council can 
easily secure truthful evidence without invoking the name of 
a deity. 
5 
Utah Constitution. Plaintiffs do not suggest herein that the 
mere mention of the word "God11 violates the Utah Consti-
tution.4 A reading of the complaint herein shows that 
plaintiffs complained of what is clearly "religious worship, 
exercise or instruction," the formal recitation of prayers as 
part of the agenda of City Council meetings. That is all 
that was and is before this Court in this action. 
The Court should decline defendants' invitation to 
speculate as to the legality of matters not before the 
Court.5 
DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
For the first time in this case, in their motion for 
clarification and objection, defendants express concerns for 
4
 Defendants may next suggest that Judge Frederick 
violated Art. I, § 4, Ut. Const, because he repeated in his 
written opinion the clearly denominational prayer recited at 
the City Council meeting of September 10, 1991. Memorandum 
Decision, March 2, 1991, p. 5, 5 12. 
Obviously, the repetition of that prayer by Judge 
Frederick was not done as "religious worship, exercise or 
instruction," and thus, does not violate the Utah 
Constitution. 
5
 If such conduct does offend the Utah Constitution 
such to warrant a lawsuit, defendants will be served a 
summons and a complaint and the matter will be formally 
presented to a Court. 
6 
the rights of individual City Council members to pray and to 
utter profanities.6 Objection Memo, p. 5. 
Defendants contend that the proposed order and ruling 
chill and inhibit the individual defendant's right to free 
speech and free exercise of their religion. Plaintiffs did 
not seek to and this Court cannot inhibit the defendants' 
individual rights to practice free speech or exercise their 
religion, outside of the governmental context, as protected 
by the Utah and federal constitutions. 
Contrary to defendants' suggestion, government 
sponsored prayers do not fall under the protection of "free 
speech" or the "free exercise of religion." Yes, defendants 
gave up certain rights when they become government officials. 
If defendants can convince a court that future 
individual prayers uttered during City Council meetings are 
"private" in nature and not sponsored, allowed or encouraged 
by government officials, such prayers may be not subject to 
Defendants' concern about of the Speech and Debate 
clause of the Utah Constitution is mis-placed. That 
provision, Art. VI, § 8, applies only to state legislators 
and not to city council members. There is no similar 
protection for city officials. 
7 
the injunction herein. But such nice fine line-drawing is 
dangerous and offers great potential for abuse.7 
The order does not violate the equal protection clause 
of the Utah or federal Constitution as applied to the 
individual defendants. All Utah government officials are 
being treated fairly; the law applies equally, none of them 
are allowed to violate provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Defendants gave up certain rights when they become 
government officials. Acting as government authorities, they 
must act within the bounds of the Utah Constitution. In 
fact, upon taking office each defendant took an oath to 
"support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of this State."8 
7
 In the area of potential abuse, defendants' good 
faith has to be questioned when they recite, " . . . the only 
activity clearly prohibited by the Memorandum Decision would 
be a repetition of the September 10, 1991 offering made by 
the Salt Lake Police Chaplin." Objection Memo, p. 2. 
8
 Oath of office. "All officers made elective or 
appointive by this Constitution or by the laws made in 
pursuance thereof, before entering upon the duties of their 
respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following 
oath or affirmation: 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that 
I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of this State, and that I 
will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity.'" 
Emphasis added. Ut.Const. Art. IV, § 10, 1896; Ut. Code 
Ann. § 52-1-4 (1953 as amended). 
Two (2) items within this constitutional provision are 
worthy of note. The provision allows an affirmation in lieu 
of an oath, and government officials take a solemn oath to 
8 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed order is sufficiently clear that a person 
of ordinary intelligence can understand it. Notwithstanding 
defendants' cavilling, based upon common usage, a reasonable 
person would know what is prohibited by the ruling and 
proposed order. To determine what is a prayer defendants can 
refer to the long-standing City Council tradition referred to 
in their policy of October 17, 1991. Exhibit "0" attached. 
The order is not vague. The order provides sufficient 
guidance to defendants, especially when read along with Art. 
I, § 4, Ut. Const., that they can govern their conduct and 
act within constitutional bounds. The order is narrowly 
drawn especially when it contains a reference to and a 
determination that prior prayers at City Council meetings 
violated the Utah Constitution. 
Defendants' suggestion that their own personal rights 
to equal protection of the laws, to free speech and to 
exercise their religion should over-ride the Utah 
Constitution are without merit. 
Neither the March 2, 1992 ruling of this Court nor the 
order as prepared by plaintiffs' counsel are in need of 
discharge their duties without reference to a deity. 
9 
clarification. Defendants' objection and motion to clarify 
should be denied. 
DATED this 18th day of MARCH, 1992. 
M. B^  
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION to: 
ROGER CUTLER & BRUCE BAIRD 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEYS 
SALT LAKE CITY & COUNTY BUILDING 
WASHINGTON SQUARE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KATHRYN KENDELL 
STAFF COUNSEL 
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS, A C L U 
BOSTON BUILDING #419 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the 18th day of MARCH, 1992, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
bmb\slcclamo rej\sos 
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R 91-1 
G 91-35 
RESOLUTION FORMALIZING THE COUNCIL'S 
PUBLIC MEETING OPENING CEREMONY PROCESS 
No. 97 of 1991 
WHEREAS, Salt Lake City was originally incorporated by 
legislation adopted by the Territorial Legislature on January 9, 
1951, and under that organization, the City commenced a tradition 
(with its first Council meeting on January 11, 1851) by having an 
opening ceremony which included a prayer; and 
WHEREAS, this tradition continued following the adoption of 
the State Constitution in 1896, with an interlude during the time 
the City adopted the Commission form of government, which form 
combined the administrative and legislative powers of the 
government and which conducted City governance in frequent 
daytime meetings; and 
WHEREAS, the opening ceremony tradition was renewed in 
January 1980, when the legislative and executive powers were 
separated because the City voted to operate under the 
Council/Mayor optional form of government, holding evening 
meetings to conduct the legislative functions of government at a 
time most convenient to citizen attendance; and 
WHEREAS, on or about September 23, 1987 the Council was 
sensitized to recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. 
District Court opinions concerning invocations at publicly 
attended legislative sessions of government; and 
WHEREAS, the Council renewed and reemphasized its policy of 
including all segments of the community in pronouncing 
invocations as part of its opening ceremonies, which also 
included a Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States; 
and 
WHEREAS, the Council has become aware of some concerns 
expressed about the Council's opening ceremonies and it desires 
to memorialize and confirm, in writing, its tradition and 
policies regarding opening ceremonies for legislative sessions 
and other public meetings conducted by the Council; 
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved that Salt Lake City does 
hereby formally adopt the annexed policy concerning opening 
ceremonies at legislative and other public gatherings, conducted 
under the auspices of Salt Lake City's legislative body. Said 
policy shall remain in effect until otherwise repealed or 
modified by a majority vote of the Council. 
Passed by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
17th day of October , 19jy. 
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL 
By Z 
CHAIRPERSON 
ATTEST: 
2 
SUGGESTIONS FOR THOSE WHO PRESENT 
THOUGHTS/READINGS/INVOCATIONS IN 
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL MEETINGS 
Thank you for taking the time to volunteer to continue our 
tradition of presenting a thought/reading/invocation at a City 
Council meeting. We have found from long experience that a 
thought/reading/invocation as a part of the opening ceremony at 
the beginning of Council meetings creates a thoughtful atmosphere 
in which to perform our services to the community. This practice 
promotes civility, sensitivity and cultural diversity. 
We recognize that we live in a community where there are 
many and diverse points of view on religion and other matters of 
philosophy. Therefore, to eliminate or reduce offense, if your 
belief or philosophy allows you to do so, we ask that your 
thought/reading/invocation comply with the following: 
1. References which may recognize or be unique to a 
particular religious belief should be avoided. 
2. The thought/reading/invocation should not include an 
attempt to convert or advance any particular faith, belief or 
philosophy or disparage any other faith, belief or philosophy. 
3. All such presentations will be made gratuitously and as 
a part of the Opening Ceremony of each of the City Council's 
regular Tuesday meetings, which will also includes a Pledge of 
Allegiance to the Flag. 
The City will not regulate or dictate the form or substance 
of a presentation. Rather, these guidelines are to remind you of 
the cultural diversity of the community and request that all 
statements be sensitive to the feelings of others and promote 
understanding, elevate motives and create a more civil 
environment for conducting the public's business. 
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL* 
*Per Council Resolution of 10/17/91. 
ATTACHMENT "2" 
Alaska Alaska Statutes (1980) 
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
Alaska Const., Art. I, §4 
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1984) 
No public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or 
instruction, or to the support of any religious 
worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of 
any religious establishment. 
Ariz. Const., Art. 2, §12 
California Cal. Code (Deering)(1981) 
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and 
county, township, school district, or other municipal 
corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay 
from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or 
in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or 
sectarian purpose, ... 
Cal. Const., art. XVI, §5 
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. (1973) 
No person shall be required to attend or support any 
ministry or place of worship, religious sect or 
denomination against his consent. Nor shall any 
preference be given by law to any religious 
denomination or mode of worship. 
Colo. Const, art. II, §4 
Idaho Idaho Code (1980) 
The exercise and enjoyment of religious faith and 
worship shall forever be guaranteed; ... No person 
shall be required to attend or support any ministry or 
place of worship, religious sect or denomination, or 
pay tithes against his consent; nor shall any 
preference be given by law to any religious 
denomination or mode of worship. Bigamy and polygamy 
are forever prohibited in the state .•. 
Idaho Const, art. I, §4 
Montana Mont. Code Ann. (1991) 
The state shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
Mont. Const, art. II, §5 
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1986) 
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship without discrimination or preference shall 
forever be allowed in this State ... 
Nev. Const, art. 1 §4 
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. (1978) 
No person shall be required to attend any place of 
worship or support any religious sect or denomination; 
nor shall any preference be given by law to any 
religious denomination or mode of worship. 
N.M. Const, art. II §11 
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat (1991) 
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the 
benefit of any religious (sic), or theological 
institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for 
the payment of any religious (sic) services in either 
house of the Legislative Assembly. 
Or. Const, art. I, §5 
Utah Utah. Code Ann.(1991) 
No public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. 
Utah Const, art I, §4 
Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. (1988) 
No public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or the support of any religious 
establishment: ... 
Wash. Const, art. 1, §11 
Wyoming Wyo Stat. Ann. (197 7) 
No money of the state shall ever be given or 
appropriated to any sectarian or religious society or 
institution. 
Wyo. Const, art. 1, §19 
Alabama Ala. Code (1975) 
That no religion shall be established by law; .. not to 
pay any tithes, taxes, or other rate for building or 
repairing any place of worship, or for maintaining any 
minister or ministry; ... 
Alabama Const., Art. I, §3 
Alaska Alaska Statutes (1980) 
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, 
Alaska Const., Art. I, §4 
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1984) 
No public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or 
instruction, or to the support of any religious 
worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of 
any religious establishment. 
Ariz. Const., Art. 2, §12 
Arkansas Ark. Stat. Ann. (19 87) 
No human authority can, in any case or manner 
whatsoever, control or interfere with the right of 
conscience; and no preference shall ever by given, by 
law, to any religious establishment, denomination or 
mode of worship above any other. 
Ark. Const., art. 2, §24 
California Cal. Code (Deering)(1981) 
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and 
county, township, school district, or other municipal 
corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay 
from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or 
in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or 
sectarian purpose, ... 
Cal. Const., art. XVI, §5 
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. (1973) 
No person shall be required to attend or support any 
ministry or place of worship, religious sect or 
denomination against his consent. Nor shall any 
preference be given by law to any religious 
denomination or mode of worship. 
Colo. Const, art. II, §4 
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. (1991) 
The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and 
worship, without discrimination, shall forever be free 
to all persons in the state; ... 
Conn. Const., art. I, §3 
Delaware Del. Code. Ann (1974) 
Although it is the duty of all men frequently to 
assemble together for the public worship ... yet no man 
shall or ought to be compelled to attend any religious 
worship, to contribute to the erection or support of 
any place or worship, or to the maintenance of any 
ministry, ... 
Del. Const, art. I, §1 
District of Columbia D.C. Code Ann. (1991) 
The State shall establish no religion nor interfere 
with the free exercise thereof. No person shall be 
denied any right or privilege because of religious 
belief or the exercise thereof. 
D.C. Const, art. I, §2 
Florida Fla. Stat. (1992) 
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of 
religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise 
thereof. ... No revenue of the state or any political 
subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from 
the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of 
any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid 
of any sectarian institution. 
Fla. Const, art. 1, §3 
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. (1983) 
Each person has the natural and inalienable right to 
worship God, each according to the dictates of that 
person's own conscience; and no human authority should, 
in any case, control or interfere with such right of 
conscience. 
Ga. Const, art. I, §1, paragraph 3 
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. (1988) 
No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or 
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
Haw. Const, art. I, §4 
Idaho Idaho Code (1980) 
The exercise and enjoyment of religious faith and 
worship shall forever be guaranteed; ... No person 
shall be required to attend or support any ministry or 
place of worship, religious sect or denomination, or 
pay tithes against his consent; nor shall any 
preference be given by law to any religious 
denomination or mode of worship. Bigamy and polygamy 
are forever prohibited in the state ... 
Idaho Const, art. I, §4 
Illinois 111. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1971) 
No person shall be required to attend or support any 
ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor 
shall any preference be given by law to any religious 
denomination or mode of worship. 
111. Const- art. 1, §3 
Indiana Ind. Code Ann. (Burns 1990) 
No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the 
benefit of any religious or theological institution. 
Ind. Const, art. 1, §6 
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. (1989) 
The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; nor shall any person be compelled to 
attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or 
other rates for building or repairing places of 
worship, or the maintenance of any minister, or 
ministry. 
Iowa Const, art. 1, §3 
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. (1988) 
The right to worship God according to the dictates of 
conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any 
person be compelled to attend or support any form of 
worship; ... nor any preference be given by law to any 
religious establishment or mode of worship. 
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights §7 
Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1988) 
No preference shall ever by given by law to any 
religious sect, society or denomination; nor to any 
particular creed, mode of worship or system of 
ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be 
compelled to attend any place of worship, to contribute 
the erection or maintenance of any such place, or to 
salary or support of any minister of religion; ... 
Ky Const. Bill of Rights §5 
Louisiana La. Constitution 
No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
La. Const, art. 1, §8 
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1991 Supp.) 
... and no subordination nor preference of any one sect 
or denomination to another shall ever be established by 
law, ... 
Me. Const, art. 1, §3 
Maryland Md. Ann. Code (1981) 
That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in 
such manner as he thinks most acceptable to Him, ... 
wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in 
his person or estate, on account of his religious 
persuasion, or profession, or for his religious 
practice ... nor ought any person to be compelled to 
frequent, or maintain, or contribute, unless on 
contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any 
ministry; ... Nothing shall prohibit or require the 
making reference to belief in, reliance upon, or 
invoking the aid of God or a Supreme Being in any 
governmental or public document, proceeding, activity, 
ceremony, school, institution, or place. Nothing in 
this article shall constitute an establishment of 
religion. 
Md. Const. Declaration of Rights art. 36 
Massachusetts Mass. Ann. Laws (1979) 
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in 
society, publicly, and at stated seasons to worship the 
Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the 
universe. 
Constitution of Massachusetts Pt. 1, Art. 2 §3 
... and no subordination of any one sect or 
denomination to another shall ever be established by 
law. 
Mass. Const, pt. 1, art. 3 §4 
Michigan Mich. Stat. Ann (1983) 
No person shall be compelled to attend, or, against his 
consent, to contribute to the erection or support of 
any place of religious worship, or to pay tithes, taxes 
or other rates for the support of any minister of the 
gospel or teacher of religion. No money shall be 
appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit 
of any religious sect or society, theological or 
religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the 
state be appropriated for any such purpose. 
Mich. Const, art. I §4 
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. (1976) 
... nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or 
support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his 
consent; ... or any preference be given by law to any 
religious establishment or mode of worship ... nor 
shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the 
benefit of any religious societies or religious or 
theological seminaries. 
Minn. Restructured Const, art. 1, §16 
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. (1972) 
... no preference shall be given by law to any 
religious sect or mode of worship; ... 
Miss. Const, art. 3, §18 
Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. (Vernon 1970) 
That no person can be compelled to erect, support or 
attend any place or system or whorship, or to maintain 
or support any priest, minister, preacher or teacher of 
any sect, church, creed or denomination of religion; 
Mo. Const, art. 1 §6 
That no money shall ever be taken from the public 
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, 
sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any 
priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; 
and that no preference shall be given to nor any 
discimination made against any church, sect or creed of 
religion, or any form of religious faith or worship. 
Mo. Const, art. 1, §7 
Montana Mont. Code Ann. (1991) 
The state shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
Mont. Const, art. II, §5 
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. (1989) 
No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or 
support any place of worship against his consent, and 
no preference shall be given by law to any religious 
society, ... 
Neb. Const, art. 1, §4 
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1986) 
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship without discrimination or preference shall 
forever be allowed in this State ... 
Nev. Const, art. 1 §4 
New Hampshire N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1988) 
But no person shall ever be compelled to pay towards 
the support of the schools of any sect or denomination. 
N.H. Const, pt. 1, art. 6 
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. (1971) 
...nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes, 
taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any 
church or churches, place or places of worship, or for 
the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary 
to what he believes to be right or has deliberately and 
voluntarily engaged to perform. 
N.J. Const, art. 1, paragraph 3 
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. (1978) 
No person shall be required to attend any place of 
worship or support any religious sect or denomination; 
nor shall any preference be given by law to any 
religious denomination or mode of worship. 
N.M. Const, art. II §11 
New York N.Y. Laws (McKinney 19 82) 
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship, without discrimination or preference, 
shall forever be allowed in this state to all mankind; 
N.Y. Const, art. 1 §3 
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. (1984) 
All persons have a natural and inalienable right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their 
own consciences, and no human authority shall, in any 
case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of 
conscience. 
N.C. Const, art. I, §13 
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code (1981) 
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship, without discrimination or preference shall 
be forever guaranteed in this state, and no person 
shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness or juror 
on account of his opinion on matters of religious 
belief; ... 
N.D. Const, art. I, §3 
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (19 79) 
No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or 
support any place of worship, or maintain any form of 
worship, against his consent; and no preference shall 
be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall 
any interference with the rights of conscience be 
permitted. 
Ohio Const, art. I, §7 
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. (199) 
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, 
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for 
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, 
denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, 
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, 
or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian 
institution as such. 
Okla. Const, art. 2, §5 
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat (1991) 
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the 
benefit of any religious (sic), or theological 
institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for 
the payment of any religious (sic) services in either 
house of the Legislative Assembly; -
Or. Const, art. I, §5 
Pennsylvania Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon 1969) 
•.. no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect 
or support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
ministry against his consent; ... and no preference 
shall ever be given by law to any religious 
establishments or modes of worship. 
Pa. Const, art. 1, §3 
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws (1987) 
... no person shall be compelled to frequent or to 
support any religious worship, place, or ministry 
whatever, except in fulfillment of such person's 
voluntary contract; ... 
R.I. Const, art. 1, §3 
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. (1976) 
The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof, ... 
S.C. Const, art. I, §2 
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws Ann. (1978) 
No person shall be compelled to attend or support any 
ministry or place of worship against his consent nor 
shall any preference be given by law to any religious 
establishment or mode of worship. No money or property 
of the state shall be given or appropriated for the 
benefit of any sectarian or religious society or 
institution. 
S.D. Const, art. VI, §3 
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. (1980) 
... that no man can of right be compelled to attend, 
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain 
any minister against his consent; ... and that no 
preference shall ever be given, by law, to any 
religious establishment or mode of worship. 
Tenn. Const, art. 1, §3 
Texas Tex. Code Ann. (Vernon 1984) 
No money shall be appropriated, or drawn from the 
Treasury for the benefit of any sect, or religious 
society, theological or religious seminary nor shall 
property belonging to the State be appropriated for any 
such purposes. 
Tex. Const, art. I, §7 
Utah Utah. Code Ann.(1991) 
No public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. 
Utah Const, art I, §4 
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. (1985) 
... and that no man ought to, or of right can be 
compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or 
support any place of worship, or maintain any minister, 
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3 
Virginia Va. Code Ann. (1987) 
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor 
shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened 
in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on 
account of his religious opinions or belief; ... And 
the General Assembly shall not prescribe any religious 
test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or 
advantages on any sect or denomination, or pass any law 
requiring or authorizing any religious society, or the 
people within any district within this Commonwealth, to 
levy on themselves or others, any tax for the erection 
or repair of any house of public worship, or for the 
support of any church or ministry, ... 
Va. Const, art. I, §16 
Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. (1988) 
No public money or property shall be appropriated for 
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or the support of any religious 
establishment: ... 
Wash. Const, art. 1, §11 
West Virginia W. Va. Code (1982) 
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever; nor 
shall any man be enforced, restrained, molested, or 
burthened, in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer on 
account of his religious opinions of belief, ... or 
pass any law requiring or authorizing any religious 
society, or the people of any district within this 
State, to levy on themselves, or others, any tax for 
the erection or repair of any house for public worship, 
or for the support of any church or ministry, ... 
W. Va. Const, art. 3, §15 
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. (1986) 
... nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect 
or support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or 
interference with, the rights of conscience be 
permitted, or any preference be given by law to any 
religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall 
any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of 
religious societies, or religious or theological 
seminaries. 
Wis. Const, art. 1, §18 
Wyoming Wyo Stat. Ann. (1977) 
No money of the state shall ever be given or 
appropriated to any sectarian or religious society or 
institution. 
Wyo. Const, art. 1, §19 
